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Navigating the Minefield of Trade
Secrets Protection in China
Daniel C.K. Chow*
ABSTRACT

Many Multinational Companies (MNCs) now consider
trade secrets to be the most important intellectualproperty right
in China, ahead of patents, trademarks, and copyrights. While
trade secrets have become more valuable than ever as a business
asset in China, many MNCs also find that the protection of
trade secrets in China is full of pitfalls and traps. Unlike in the
case of patents, trademarks, and copyrights, China has no
unified law governing trade secrets, but has disjointed
provisions scattered throughout various laws. The pitfalls are
also created by a high evidentiary burden in proving a theft of a
trade secret that many MNCs find difficult to meet. China
places an emphasis on documentary proof of the theft of the
trade secret, which can be difficult to obtain. A comparison of
the enforcement of trademarks in China with the enforcement of
trade secrets illustrates how much more difficult it is to enforce
trade secrets. In addition, MNCs that attempt to enforce their
trade secrets can find themselves caught in risky and dangerous
entanglements with Chinese enforcement authorities. These
enforcement authorities often demand illegal payments as a
price of enforcement. While these enforcement problems admit of
no easy solutions given the realities of China's current trade
secrets legal regime, many of these problems can be avoided
altogether if MNCs implemented some simple advanced
planning and preventative measures. MNCs should invest in
these preventative measures that, if carefully implemented, can
avoid the traps in China's murky enforcement regime while at

* Joseph S. Platt-Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur Professor of Law, the Ohio State
University Michael E. Moritz College of Law. The author lived and worked in China as
in-house counsel for a multinational company and handled firsthand counterfeiting and
trade secret cases. The author also serves as a consultant to MNCs on intellectual
property disputes and international trade issues involving China. Some of the
observations in this Article are based on those experiences.
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the same time protect valuable confidential and propriety
information of the company.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many multinational companies (MNCs) doing business in the
People's Republic of China (China) find protecting trade secrets, the
commercially valuable technical and business information MNCs
protect through confidentiality measures, to be a growing problem.'
For the first time, in a recent survey of MNCs doing business in
China the majority of respondents selected trade secrets as the
intellectual property right of most concern, ranking trade secrets

See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Fan Bu Zheng Dang Jing Zheng Fa
[Anti-Unfair
Competition Law of the PRC]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1993,
effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 10 (China) (stating that "'trade secret' shall mean technical
information and business information that is unknown to the public, can bring
economic benefits to the owner, is of a practical nature, and is protected by
confidentiality measures taken by the right owner."); see also infra Part III(A).
1.

(E
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ahead of trademarks, patents, and copyrights. 2 The recent concern
with trade secrets is highlighted by a number of high profile cases. In
a notorious case, General Motors (GM) discovered that Chery, a
Chinese state-owned automaker, was marketing the QQ subcompact
car, a nearly identical copy of GM's Chevrolet Spark. Chery, however,
was selling the QQ at one-third of the price.3 GM claimed that the
two cars were built based on proprietary mathematical data and
formulas that were stolen from GM.4 GM brought a lawsuit against
Chery in China but the two parties eventually settled the case.5 Since
the settlement, Chery has announced its plans to export cars to the
United States, and it is unclear how much of an advantage Chery was
able to gain through obtaining access to GM's proprietary
information. 6 In a 2013 case, a former employee of the Chinese
multinational pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly downloaded copies of
confidential documents from Lilly's computer server with the
probable intention of making them available to Lilly's competitors in
China. 7 E.I. du Pont, Corning, and American Superconductor, all
U.S.-based MNCs, have recently brought cases of trade secret theft in
China.8

2.
See
U.S.-CHINA
BUSINESS
COUNCIL,
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR
STRENGTHENING TRADE SECRET PROTECTION 2 (2013) (providing data drawn from

USCBC member company surveys). Forty percent of respondents selected trade
secrets, while 27 percent selected trademarks, 20 percent selected patents, and 8
percent selected copyright. See id (summarizing data drawn from 2013 survey
responses).
3.
See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Protecting Trade Secrets in China: Update on
Employee Disclosures and the Limitations of the Law, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 399, 400 (2008)
(discussing the litigation and eventual settlement between GM and Chery).
4.
See id. ("As U.S. Commerce Secretary Donald Evans stated, '[t]his incident
defies an innocent explanation. The QQ and the Spark are twins because both cars
were built from the same DNA-proprietary mathematical data and formulas-that
were stolen from GM Daewoo and used to build the QQ."').
5.
See id. (discussing the settlement that occurred soon after GM brought suit
against Chery in a Shanghai court).
6.
See id. at 400-01 ("Most recently, Chery entered into a low-cost production
venture with Chrysler Group, which includes the goal of exporting cars from China to
the United States .... [Ilt is unclear how much of an advantage Chery initially gained
through misappropriation of trade secrets . . . .").
7.
See Olivia Zhan, The FirstPreliminaryInjunction Issued by China Court in
Trade Secrets Cases, SQUIRE SANDERS (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g-6ba18a27-48fc-4916-93d3-6fdb07f78clb
[http://perma.cc/G7SS-UAL7]
(archived Aug. 31, 2014) (providing background information regarding a recent
preliminary injunction granted by a Chinese court).
8.
See Ryan Ong, Trade Secret Enforcement in China: Options and Obstacles,
CHINA BUS. REV. (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/trade-secretenforcement-in-china-options-and-obstacles
[http://perma.cc/AF3S-2TJU]
(archived
Aug 31, 2014) (referencing several cases brought by companies against Chinese
individuals or Chinese companies).
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Theft of trade secrets in China is considered to be a widespread
and common problem. 9 The Chinese government recently
acknowledged the importance of trade secrets; this acknowledgement
reflects China's own concern that a lax environment that results in
industrial espionage is detrimental to China's own long-term
interests.10 On December 20, 2013, the U.S.-China Joint Commission
on Commerce and Trade, a high-level government forum for dialogue
on trade issues between the United States and China, announced
that trade secret protection and enforcement and legislative reform
would be a top priority for the Chinese government in 2014.11
The recent attention to trade secrets is fueled by not only the
growing importance of trade secrets as business assets for all MNCs
doing business in China but also by the growing frustration of MNCs
faced with the many difficulties of protecting trade secrets.12
Enforcement of all intellectual property rights in China has long been
a concern for MNCs, but trade secrets pose a special and unique set of
issues for MNCs in China for at least three reasons.
First, while only some MNCs have commercially valuable
trademarks, patents, and copyrights in China, the majority of MNCs
doing business in China either have commercially valuable trade
secrets when they enter the Chinese market or develop them in quick
order.' 3 As a result, while some MNCs expend significant resources to
protect their trademarks from counterfeiting and infringement, and
others focus on enforcing their patent rights, almost every MNC has
9.
See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Protecting Know-How from Walking Out the
Door in China: Protection of Trade Secrets, 55 BUS. HORIZONS 329, 329 (2012)
(hereinafter Pagnattaro, ProtectingKnow-How) ("Loss of trade secrets is perceived as a
widespread problem, creating a climate that can be especially challenging for
companies.").
10.
See U.S.-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, supra note 2 ("Such government
actions reflect a growing understanding within the Chinese government about negative
consequences of insufficient trade secrets protection.").
11.
The announcement came at conclusion of the 24th annual U.S.-China Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT). The JCCT is a body that considers trade
and business issues, including intellectual property issues, between the United States
and China. The U.S. delegation was headed by Penny Pritzker, the U.S. Commerce
Secretary, and Michael Froman, U.S. Trade Representative, and the Chinese
government was represented by Vice Premier Wang Yang. See U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 24TH U.S.-CHINA JOINT COMMISSION ON COMMERCE AND TRADE FACT
SHEET (2013), available at http://www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2013/12/20/factsheet-24th-us-%E2%80%93china-joint-commission-commerce-and-trade-fact-sheet
[http://perma.cc/AE79-2B6A] (archived Aug. 31, 2014) (outlining several topics
discussed during a meeting between the United States and China). The JCCT meets
for several days on an annual basis to discuss trade and business issues of common
concern between the United States and China.
12.
See J. Benjamin Bai & Guoping Da, Strategies for Trade Secrets Protection
in China, 9 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 351, 353-54 (2011) (noting the growth rate of
foreign related intellectual property disputes in China to be "exponential" but also
noting that the relatively few trade secrets cases have been reported due to the
difficulties of proof in trade secrets cases).
13.
See infra Part II.B.
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trade secrets that need protecting. 14 While this need means that
every MNC needs to implement precautionary measures to protect
trade secrets,15 not all do, and many MNCs do not understand all of
the pitfalls that come with enforcement of trade secrets until after
theft has already occurred.16 For the majority of MNCs doing
business in China, there are two sources of trade secrets specific to
their Chinese operations that need protecting. Some MNCs transfer
technology to China protected as a trade secret, rather than protected
as a patent or through some other form of intellectual property right.
For example, an MNC might transfer an advanced chemical formula
and process used in making industrial products, such as rubber
resins, to its Chinese business entity as a trade secret.' 7 The chemical
formula and process become the basic technology (i.e. the know-how)
used by the Chinese business entity to manufacture products for the
Chinese market. If a competitor were able to gain access to the trade
secret and use the advanced formula, the competitor could gain a
business advantage that could be highly damaging to the MNC. In
other cases, the MNC's Chinese business entity might develop trade
secrets in the process of using the MNC's transferred technology.
While trade secrets often relate to technology contained in the
product sold by the MNC, the trade secrets also include confidential
business information, such as logistics, financial data, customer lists,
marketing strategies, advertisement camp signs, and expansion plans
that are not directly related to the manufacture of the product.' 8 The
vast bulk of MNCs doing business in China will, over time, develop
the type of information that could be harmful if leaked to a
competitor.' 9
Second, trade secrets are notoriously difficult to enforce in China
and present obstacles that are in some important respects even
greater than hurdles in the enforcement of other intellectual property
rights, such as trademarks. 20 Unlike other forms of intellectual
property, such as trademarks, patents, and copyrights, which all have
a uniform law, China's laws that pertain to trade secrets are
scattered throughout various laws, including the Anti-Unfair

14.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part IV.
15.
16.
This observation is based upon the author's analysis of trade secrets and
unfair competition cases brought in China and on his own discussions with lawyers,
academics, and in-house counsel in China.
17.
All MNCs are required under Chinese law to establish a China business
entity (i.e., a domestic Chinese company) in order to do business on the ground in
China. The MNC owns the China business entity in whole or in part. See infra Part
II.B.
See id.
18.
See id.
19.
See infra Part III.C.
20.
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Competition Law, 21 the Labor Law,22 the Labor Contract Law, 23 the
Company Law, 24 the Contract Law,25 and the Criminal Law. 26 In
addition, there does not appear to be any impetus in China for
creating a unified trade secrets law in the near future, and vested
political interests may prevent the creation of such a law. Moreover,
an analysis of these laws indicate that, compared with other
intellectual property rights, trade secrets present an especially high
evidentiary burden on plaintiffs and could involve a complex
procedure that could create many traps for an MNC.2 7 One major
hurdle is that, unlike trademarks and patents, trade secrets are not
subject to a registration system in China so there is no documentary
evidence, such as a registration certificate officially issued by the
PRC authorities, of the ownership of the trade secret by the plaintiff.
Enforcing trade secrets involving intangible knowledge, without any
supporting documentary evidence, becomes a difficult, if not
insurmountable, problem because Chinese government authorities
have a strong preference for documentary evidence in all cases.2 8
Documentary evidence is practically the only form that is given

See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Fan Bu Zheng Dang Jing Zheng Fa
Competition Law of the PRC]
[Anti-Unfair
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1993,
effective Dec. 1, 1993), arts. 2, 10, 25 (China) (describing what constitutes infringing
upon another's trade secret and the penalty for infringing); see also discussion infra
Part III(A).
22.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Lao Dong Fa (9ARAM
#
W)
[Labor Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong.,
July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) (China) (defining when a non-competition provision
may be included in an employment contract); see also infra Part III(A).
23.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Lao Dong He Tong Fa
[Labor Contract Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the
(MCA)
Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) (China)
(establishing employee liability for trade secret infringement beyond general liability
for breach of employment contract); see also infra Part III(A).
24.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Gong Si Fa (
[Company Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), arts. 149-50 (China) (prohibiting the disclosure of
company secrets by directors or senior managers); see also infra Part III(A).
21.

(

25.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo He Tong Fa ('PA*),
R)
[Contract Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) (China) (setting out the guidelines for technology
transfer contracts); see also infra Part III.A.
26.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Xing Fa (rP*)ARA#
RjA)
[Criminal Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997) (China) (establishing criminal liability in certain
instances of trade secret infringement); see also infra Part III.A.
27.
See infra Part III.C.
28.

See ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, EMPLOYMENT LAW YEARBOOK

865 (Timothy J. Long, Andrew R. Livingston, & Joshua C. Vaughn, eds., 2012)
(discussing evidence collection in trade secrets cases)
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significant weight in Chinese courts; oral testimony is often regarded
as of little probative value.29 The use of documentary evidence in
enforcement of intellectual property rights can be crucial because it is
often difficult to obtain. Several examples, further discussed below,
will illustrate this difficulty.3 0 Since trade secrets and trademarks are
both considered to be part of the law of unfair competition, later parts
of this Article will compare the enforcement of trade secrets and
trademarks in China.31 As this Article will show, obtaining
enforcement of trademark rights in China can be a straightforward
process; an enforcement action can be obtained from Chinese
administrative authorities in some cases
immediately on
application, 32 whereas obtaining enforcement of trade secrets can be
a long and arduous process, full of pitfalls. Part of this explanation
lies in China's strong preference for documentary evidence, which is
easily obtainable in trademark cases but often difficult in trade
secrets cases.33 Not surprisingly, Chinese enforcement authorities are
wary of acting outside the scope of their powers. Chinese authorities
are therefore especially cautious when dealing with claims of theft of
trade secrets that are not supported by both documentary proof of the
ownership of the trade secret as well as documentary proof of its
subsequent theft. 34
Third, the protection of trade secrets can provide advantages to
an MNC that are not available in the case of trademarks, patents,
and copyrights, but the MNC must exploit these advantages or lose
an important opportunity to protect its trade secrets, made all the
more significant by the difficulties of enforcement once the trade
secret is stolen. These advantages are that the protection of trade
secrets is under greater control by the MNC or its Chinese business
entity than the protection of other forms of intellectual property
rights. 35 In the case of trademarks, once the branded product enters
the stream of commerce, nothing prevents pirates and infringers from
producing counterfeits and knock-offs. The owner of a patent or

29.
See id. ("Documentary evidence is practically the only form of evidence that
carries significant weight in a Chinese court. Oral testimony, while admissible, usually
has little or no probative value.").
30.
See infra Part III.C.1.
31.
See id.
32.
While enforcement of trademarks can be obtained expeditiously, the
problem of deterrence is a different issue. Enforcement of trademarks against
infringers often carries few consequences and does not deter infringers from repeating
their offenses. See Daniel Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multinationals in
China: How a Flawed Approach is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT'L
L. 749, 757 (2010) [hereinafter Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting] (advocating that MNCs
ought to shift focus toward achieving long-term deterrence as opposed to focus on shortterm enforcement).
See infra Part III.C.1.
33.
34.
See id. (explaining that proof of ownership of a trade secret and its theft are
part of the burden of proof in trade secrets cases).
35.
See infra Part IV.
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copyright also loses control over the ability of others to make
unauthorized copies once the trademark enters the stream of
commerce. The owner of trade secrets, however, has the ability to
protect the trade secret cases from disclosure to unauthorized third
parties by making sure that the trade secret remains confidential.3 6
The need to protect trade secrets is further increased by the effect of
two factors. One is the problem of effective enforcement once the theft
of the trade secret has already occurred.3 7 The second factor that
creates incentives for implementing effective preventative measures
is that, for MNCs, the theft of trade secrets tends to occur in cases
when current or former employees of the MNC's Chinese business
entity are involved.3 8 One of the most common scenarios involving
theft of trade secrets is when a former employee is lured to work for a
competitor. For example, Microsoft brought multiple lawsuits when a
high-level executive in Microsoft's Chinese operations was hired by
Google to head Google's Chinese operations. 39 While Microsoft was a
high-profile case that drew widespread media coverage, former
management-level employees with access to proprietary know-how
and confidential information are often lured to work for competitors
in China. 40 These developments would indicate that MNCs should
invest significant resources in developing internal preventative
measures that focus on current employees since the MNC's leverage
and negotiating power is at its highest while the employee is still
currently working at the MNC's Chinese business entity. 4 1 Once the
employee leaves, the relationship between the employer and the
former employee could deteriorate or become hostile, and it then
becomes necessary to proceed with civil litigation or criminal
proceedings. 42 As noted earlier, there are significant evidentiary and
institutional barriers to enforcing trade secrets in China, but if the

36.
See infra note 90. There is an important qualification to this point:
discovery of a trade secret through reverse engineering of a product is lawful. If the
owner of a trade secret creates a product using ingredients or through a process that
can be discovered by a competitor through an analysis of the product, so-called "reverse
engineering," then the trade secret has become disclosed and is no longer protected.
37.
See infra Part III. C.
38.
See US-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 9 ("[A] considerable
amount of trade secrets theft stems from incidents of misappropriation caused by
current or former employees.").
39.
See Pagnattaro, Protecting Know-How, supra note 9 (discussing the
litigation between the two companies and noting that the case was eventually settled
outside the courtroom).
40.
See id. ("Primary threats to the disclosure of proprietary information
include deliberate actions of current and former employees, as well as loss of trade
secrets in the context of joint ventures or other business arrangements." (citation
omitted)).
41.
See infra Part IV.
42.
This observation is based on the author's own working experience in China.
Former employees tend to become uncooperative and hostile when confronted with
claims of misappropriation once they leave employment.
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MNC has invested in a significant compliance program, the program
could greatly increase the ability of the MNC to protect its trade
secrets. 43
This Article will develop and examine these themes in three
parts. Part II of this Article discusses technology transfer and the
importance of trade secrets to MNCs doing business in China. The
majority of MNCs that do business in China will need to transfer
technology, embodied in intellectual property rights, to their Chinese
business entities; as part of this technology transfer agreement, the
MNC should have provisions that pertain to trade secrets even if the
main subject matter of the technology transfer agreement is another
intellectual property right, such as trademark or patent rights. Part
II will also explain why, even if the MNC does not transfer trade
secrets to its Chinese business entity at the inception, the business
entity will almost inevitably develop trade secrets that the MNC will
wish to protect in the future. Part III of this Article will discuss the
fragmented legal framework in China that applies to trade secrets.
Unlike trademarks, patents, and copyright, which all have unified,
comprehensive laws, trade secrets are subject to a patchwork of
different laws and are still dominated by the Anti-Unfair Competition
Law of 1993. Part IV of this Article focuses on preventative measures
that MNCs might take to protect their trade secrets. Given the
difficulties of the enforcement of trade secrets, and the bureaucratic
and institutional interests that might resist change, the most prudent
course of action for most MNCs is to invest in preventative measures
under the present legal regime. It might be overly optimistic or even
naive to think that China will enact a unified trade secrets law in the
near future that will reduce or eliminate the problems in
enforcement. 44 It is more realistic to accept the limitations of the
present legal regime and to invest in preventative measures, which
appears to be the most promising area in which MNCs can invest
their resources to protect their trade secrets.

II. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND TRADE SECRETS IN CHINA

The majority of MNCs that do business in China will need to
engage in technology transfer, that is the licensing of intellectual
property rights by the owner of the technology to a licensee in China

See infra Part IV.
43.
For example, in a related area, the United States and China have been
44.
engaged in dialogue over how to improve the enforcement climate against trade
counterfeiting in China for over a decade. However, the counterfeiting problem has not
improved and may have gotten worse. See generally Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting, supra
note 32.
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that is usually owned in part or in whole by the MNC. 45 The
discussion below considers technology transfer, the relevant laws
applicable to technology transfer, and the relevant role of trade
secrets.
A. Technology Transfer in China
MNCs that intend to conduct business operations on the ground
in China are required by Chinese law to first establish business
entities in China. 4 6 For example, in order to establish a
manufacturing facility in China, an MNC must first establish a
foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) that qualifies as a Chinese company
under domestic law. 47 The MNC cannot directly own and operate the
manufacturing facility. Under Chinese law, the FIE must own and
operate the facility, but the MNC can own the FIE in whole or in
part.
Most MNCs that do business in China choose to establish FIEs
through either a joint venture or a wholly foreign-owned enterprise
(WFOE).48 A joint venture is a Chinese business entity formed by an
MNC, the foreign investor, and a local partner, often a Chinese stateowned enterprise. 49 The joint-venture partners each contribute equity
in the form of cash or in-kind contributions (e.g., land use rights) and
obtain equity ownership interests in the joint venture in proportion to
the equity contribution of each.5 0 If the MNC invests 60 percent of the
equity in the joint venture and the Chinese state-owned enterprise
invests 40 percent of the equity, then the MNC has a 60 percent
equity interest in the joint venture and the Chinese partner has a 40
percent interest.51 The joint venture is a distinct and separate legal

45.
See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESs TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 324 (2d ed. 2010)
(discussing international technology transfer and emphasizing "the importance of
technology transfer in modern international business transactions").
46.
See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & ANN M. HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 85 (2012) (discussing business and legal issues that
foreign investors seeking to conduct business operations in China must consider).
47.
See id. (introducing FIEs available to MNCs seeking to conduct business
operations in China).
48.
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 45, at 489-90 (discussing the
advantages and disadvantages of joint ventures and WFOEs).
49.
See CHOW & HAN, supra note 46, at 88 ("A joint venture is a business entity
that is formed by an MNC and a local Chinese business entity, generally either a stateowned enterprise or a private company.").
50.
See id. at 90 ("Under all joint ventures, both the foreign partner and the
Chinese partner are required to make capital contributions in the form of cash or in
kind as part of the start-up costs of the joint venture . . .. Once all of the requirements
are met, the profits can be divided between the two investors in proportion to their
capital contributions.").
51.
See id. at 102 ('"The contribution of registered capital by each joint venture
partner represents its ownership or equity interest in the new company.").
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entity from each of the joint-venture partners, which are separate
corporate entities in their own right. 52 The joint venture is capable of
incurring its own separate debts and legal liabilities. By contrast, a
WFOE is wholly-owned by the MNC without any participation by a
Chinese entity. 53 The MNC will invest the entirety of the capital
necessary to establish the WFOE. Similar to the joint venture, the
WFOE is also a distinct and separate legal entity. 54 The WFOE is
considered to be a Chinese company under domestic law that is
owned by the MNC, a foreign investor. Both the joint venture and the
WFOE continue to be popular business vehicles among MNCs in
China.
At the point when the MNC establishes the joint venture or
WFOE in China, it is a legal entity that is otherwise an empty shell.
The MNC will inject capital, often in the form of cash, and the local
partner will also inject capital, in cash or in-kind contributions of
land, buildings, or equipment, to the joint venture.55 This capital may
be used to acquire or purchase land-use rights, buildings, machinery,
equipment, and power inputs, such as electricity, water, gas, and
steam.56 At this point, even though the FIE has all of the necessary
physical structures necessary to operate, the FIE will still lack the
know-how, knowledge, or technology necessary to produce the goods.
Take the example of an MNC in the consumer products industry
that establishes a joint venture to be a manufacturing facility for
producing laundry detergent that will be sold in China. Even though
the joint venture may have the necessary physical structures (i.e.
buildings, equipment, machinery, and power), the joint venture will
be unable to manufacture the MNC's laundry detergent unless the
MNC gives access to its proprietary know-how and intellectual
property to the joint venture. In order to sell the laundry detergent in
China, the MNC will need to allow the joint venture to have access to
both the MNC's chemical formula for the laundry detergent as well as
use of the MNC's trademarks and know-how.
In a typical case, the MNC will first register any trademarks in
China in its own name and then will license the use of its trademarks

52.
See id. at 88-89 ("[Iun a true joint venture, the end result is that there are
three companies: Company A (the MNC), Company B (the Chinese partner), and
Company C, the joint venture.").
53.
See id. at 91 ("[Tlhe wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) is a legal
business entity that is owned entirely by the foreign investor with no participation
from a Chinese partner.").
54.
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 45, at 490 (comparing joint ventures
and WFOEs).
55.
See CHOW & HAN, supra note 46, at 101 ("Registered capital can be
contributed by the parties in cash or in kind, in the form of buildings and equipment. It
is common for MNCs to contribute cash and for the local partner to contribute in
kind.").
56.
See id. at 100 (explaining the ways in which registered capital can be used
to meet the start-up costs of a joint venture).
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to the joint venture.5 7 This license agreement is a form of technology
transfer whereby the owner of the patents and trademarks gives
access to the proprietary technology under a licensing agreement to a
third party, the joint venture.5 8 MNCs use a license agreement
because, under such an agreement, the MNC remains the owner of
the intellectual property rights, and the licensee has been merely
authorized to use the licensed technology.5 9 To establish its
ownership, the MNC will first register the trademark or patent in its
own name with the Chinese authorities.6 0 The MNC then licenses or
gives permission to the joint venture or WFOE to use the intellectual
property. 61 The joint venture or WFOE is permitted by the MNC to
use the intellectual property rights, but the MNC remains the owner
of the rights. 62 The MNC's ownership rights are established by its
official registration certificate for the patent or trademark. 63 If, for
any reason, the joint venture or WFOE terminates, the licensing
agreement also terminates, and the MNC remains the owner of the
intellectual property rights. 64
B. Technology Transfer and Protection of Trade Secrets
In some cases, the MNC will choose to transfer know-how as a
trade secret. The requirements for a patent include novelty,
nonobviousness, and utility, and might be difficult to satisfy. 6 5 There

57.
See id. at 321 (discussing the "proper procedure" for acquisition and
licensing of intellectual property rights).
58.
See id. at 320-21 (describing MNCs as owners of intellectual property
rights, and FlEs as licensees of intellectual property rights).
59.
See id. at 321 ("The licensees have a right to use the licensed intellectual
property, but they acquire no ownership rights.").
60.
See id. (explaining that an MNC first acquires intellectual property rights
in China under its own name).
61.
See id. (providing that after acquiring intellectual property rights in its own
name, an MNC licenses intellectual property rights to an FIE).
62.
See id. (differentiating the rights of MNC owners from the rights of FIE
licensees).
63.
See id. at 102 ("Once the joint venture is established, it will issue a
certificate to each of the joint venture partners stating their equity interests. This
certificate also serves as proof of the ownership interest of each partner in the joint
venture.").
64.
See id. at 321 ("If, for any reason, the licensing agreements between [the
MNC] and its China FIEs are terminated, [the MNC] remains the undisputed owner of
the technology.").
65.
See Patent Law of the PRC (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009) (China) (providing that novelty,
creativity, and practical use are required under Chinese law); see also 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102-03 (2006) (providing that novelty, nonobviousness, and utility are required
under U.S. law). Although China's terms differ slightly from those used by the United
States, they are deemed to be equivalent. Both U.S. and Chinese law are
implementations of the requirements that are set forth in the Agreement on TradeRelated Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), a mandatory obligation of the World
Trade Organization. Article 27 of TRIPs provides that "patents shall be available for
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may also be reasons why an MNC will choose trade secret protection
for its proprietary know-how even if the know-how qualifies for
patent protection. Assume, for example, that an MNC uses a complex
chemical formula to produce an industrial product, like the rubber
resin used in making tires for automobiles. 66 Or, suppose that the
MNC uses proprietary mathematical data and formulas for a design
of an advanced truck axel for trucks that can haul very heavy loads.67
The MNC might choose to protect the know-how as a trade secret as
opposed to using patent law because a patent has a maximum term of
protection of under U.S. and Chinese law of twenty years, after which
the know-how enters the public domain. 68 A trade secret, however,
can be protected indefinitely, so long as it is not disclosed to the
public. 69 To protect its proprietary technology for an indefinite and
unlimited period, the MNC might chose to treat the technology as a
trade secret. One of the most famous examples of know-how that is
protected as a trade secret is the formula for Coca-Cola.70 Business
executives at Coca-Cola made the decision to forgo patent protection

inventions ... [that] are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial
application." An accompanying footnote states that "the terms 'inventive step' and
'capable of industrial application' may be deemed by a Member to be synonymous with
the terms 'non-obvious' and 'useful' respectively." All WTO members, including China
and the United States, must include these requirements as a condition of patentability.
66.
This observation is based upon the author's experience serving as an expert
witness in an intellectual property dispute involving an MNC doing business in China.
67.
This observation is based upon the author's experience serving as a
consultant for an MNC doing business in China.
68.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), a
mandatory obligation of the World Trade Organization, requires a minimum patent
protection term of twenty years that must be implemented by all of its members, which
includes China and the United States. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (providing for the
contents and terms of patents); Patent Law of the PRC art. 10 ("If a Chinese unit or
individual intends to transfer the right to apply for a patent or patent rights to a
foreigner, foreign enterprise or other foreign organization, it or he shall perform the
procedures in accordance with the provisions of relevant laws and administrative
regulations."); Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights art. 33, Apr.
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs] ("The term of
protection available shall not end before the expiration of twenty years counted from
the filing date.").
69.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Fan Bu Zheng Dang Jing Zheng Fa
(9PA-RliliTIEMi0A) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1993,
effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 10 (China) (describing what amounts to infringement of a
trade secret and what qualifies as a trade secret); see also Li Mi, Trade Secrets and
Patents Compared, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/
Article/3253061/Channel/7576/Trade-secrets-and-patents-compared.html
[http://
perma.cclTV82-BUD6] (archived Aug. 31, 2014) (2013) ("[T]he duration of trade secret
protection is indefinite.").

70.

See Gene Qinn, Vault with Coca Cola Trade Secret Formulaon Public Display,

IPWATCHDOG, http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/01/06/vault-with-coca-cola-trade-secretformula-on-public-display/id=21588/ [http://perma.cc/4X3R-BUH6] (archived Aug. 31, 2014)
(describing the measures that have been taken to keep the Coca-Cola formula a secret).

1020

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[voL. 47-1007

for the formula for Coca-Cola, protecting it as a trade secret in order
to be able to protect the formula indefinitely. 7 '
If an MNC protects its basic technology through trade secrets
law, the MNC should license the trade secrets to the FIE. Note the
basic difference between the licensing by an MNC of its trademarks
and patents to an FIE, and the licensing of its trade secrets to an FIE
in China. When an MNC licenses its trademarks or patents, the MNC
first obtains a registration of the trademark or patent in China, and
then licenses the right in a separate agreement to the joint venture or
WFOE. The registration is official documentary evidence of
ownership of the intellectual property right by the MNC. In the case
of trade secrets, the MNC cannot register the trade secrets in China
as there is no mechanism under Chinese law for such registration. 72
Under China's present legal regime, the MNC has no mechanism
under Chinese law that conclusively establishes that the Chinese
government recognizes that the MNC is the owner of a trade secret
before Chinese courts, administrative, or other enforcement
authorities.7 3 The inability to obtain an official documentation of
ownership leads to traps in the enforcement process as discussed
further in the next part of this Article.74
The MNC should nevertheless enter into a written licensing
agreement for its trade secrets with its Chinese FIEs. This licensing
agreement will help to establish that the MNC is the owner of the
trade secrets and will dispel any confusion that the joint venture or
the WFOE has any ownership rights in the trade secrets. Under
Chinese law, the licensing agreement must be in writing to be valid.7 5
The licensing agreement should also set out the chemical formulas, as
discussed in the examples above, and any other trade secrets in detail
so the MNC has a full written record of its trade secrets. Otherwise,
without a written record of the trade secrets, it will become much
more difficult to argue before the Chinese authorities that the MNC's
trade secrets have been stolen. If the MNC does not have a licensing
agreement with a detailed written record of the trade secrets, the
MNC will likely face higher evidentiary burdens in order to satisfy

71.
Coca-Cola's formula has been protected as a trade secret since 1886. See id.
(explaining that Coca-Cola's formulation has been kept a close secret since its
invention by Dr. John S. Pemberton).
72.
The author and the library research staff at the Moritz College of Law has
done an exhaustive search of China's legal system and found no official government
registration system for trade secrets.

73.

See id.

See infra Part III(B)-(C).
74.
75.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo He Tong Fa (9
A
-ft
I 1)
[Contract Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), art. 342 (China) (defining technological transfer
contract and stipulating that such a contract must be in writing).
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the demands of Chinese authorities that the MNC prove that it owns
trade secrets.
A written licensing agreement between the MNC and its FIE can
help to resolve any disputes over which entity owns the trade secret.
Returning to the earlier example involving laundry detergent,
suppose that the MNC gives access to its proprietary detergent
formula to its joint venture but does not have a written licensing
agreement protecting the formula as a trade secret. The local partner
in the joint venture, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, might use the
proprietary formula to improve the quality of its own detergent
products under its own brand name that it manufactures separately
from the joint venture. Such an act could lead to tensions between the
MNC and the Chinese state-owned enterprise because the MNC
might see this action as a breach of trust. 76 From the local partner's
perspective, however, nothing has been stated about the proprietary
nature of the know-how, and the local partner believes that obtaining
access to advanced technology is one of the major reasons why it
entered into the joint venture in the first place. A written licensing
agreement could prevent this type of incident and the hostilities that
might ensue. A licensing agreement provides a written record of who
owns the trade secret and the scope of the covered trade secret so
there is no doubt about the illegality of a separate use by the local
partner.
Even in cases where the MNC has not transferred a basic
technology as a trade secret to its FIE in China as part of establishing
the joint venture or wholly foreign-owned enterprise, it is all but
inevitable that the MNC's Chinese FIEs will develop confidential
information that the MNC will want to protect as trade secrets in the
course of doing business over a period of time in China. Returning to
the example of a joint venture producing laundry detergent, the joint
venture will manufacture products that will be sold under the
trademarks licensed to the FIE by the MNC. In order to succeed in
any competitive sector, such as the consumer products market, the
MNC's Chinese business entities will need to engage in strategic
business decisions, such as marketing and advertising, product
promotions, logistics, strategies for dealing with competitors, and
overall strategies for the Chinese market.7 7 Over the course of several
years, management-level business executives could accumulate a

76.
This incident is based upon the author's own work experience in China. The
tensions that ensued as a result of the local partner's use of the MNC's proprietary
technology led to the termination of the joint venture.
77.
See Mi, supra note 69 ("Virtually any business information can be protected
as a trade secret provided appropriate measures are taken to keep it confidential.
Trade secrets can include technical information such as formulae, patterns, processes,
devices, designs, drawings, programs, new product information before market launch
and commercial information like actual or potential supplier or customer lists,
management techniques, marketing, sales and advertising strategies.").
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great deal of valuable confidential information: financial data,
customer lists, new product development, and new marketing
strategies.78 Similarly, in most competitive industries in China, the
vast majority of MNCs doing business in China develop valuable
confidential information that the MNC will wish to protect even if the
trade secret is not part of the basic technology that was transferred
under the original licensing agreement when the joint venture or
WFOE was first established.
The importance of trade secrets to MNCs doing business in
China raises the question of whether rights in trade secrets can be
effectively enforced in China. The next part of this Article examines
China's legal framework for enforcing trade secrets and the issues
that can arise.

III. CHINA'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS

Unlike trademarks, patents, and copyrights, trade secrets in
China are not governed by a unified law but are subject to scattered
provisions in different laws.7 9 This fragmented legal framework
creates a host of problems for MNCs that seek to enforce their trade
secrets, make amendments to the laws, or create a unified law. The
fragmentation is due to vested interests by different authorities
interested in protecting their own sphere of authority. Although there
are many possible explanations for the lack of a comprehensive law,
and a detailed examination of such causes is beyond the scope of this
Article, one possible explanation is that, unlike the other major forms
of intellectual property, trade secrets do not enjoy substantial
protections in the World Trade Organization (WTO).80 Under the
WTO, all member countries, including the United States and China,
are obligated to provide substantial protections for trademarks,
patents, and copyrights. 8 ' Comprehensive international treaties
governing trademarks, patents, and copyrights have existed for over

78.

See id. ("Any technology, know-how or business information that has been

kept confidential will constitute a trade secret.").
79.
See infra Part III.A.
80.
The WTO is the world's most important multilateral organization dealing
with international trade. The WTO has major treaties dealing with the trade in goods,
services, and intellectual property. The WTO treaty dealing with international
property is TRIPs.
81.
Becoming a member of TRIPs is mandatory at the same time that a country
becomes a member of the WTO. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 45, at 589 (The
effect of TRIPs . . . is that all WTO members must now enact IP laws that meet the
minimal substantive standards of TRIPs . . . ."). TRIPs Articles 9-14 create obligations
related to copyrights, TRIPs Articles 15-21 create obligations related to trademarks,
and TRIPs Articles 27-34 create obligations related to patents.
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one hundred years. 82 These treaties have now been incorporated, in
substantial part, into the WTO. This incorporation creates mandatory
obligations for all WTO members.83 The WTO, however, contains only
one provision relating to the protection of trade secrets with which
China seems to be in compliance. 84 Prior to joining the WTO in 2001,
China spent years revising its patent, trademark, and copyright laws
in order to comply with TRIPs but did not make any revisions to the
1993 Anti-Unfair Competition Law, the major legislation applying to
trade secrets. It is possible that China's lack of a comprehensive law
on trade secrets can be traced to a lack of substantial treaty
obligations relating to trade secrets.8 5 The reality is that for now, and
for the near future, China has a number of provisions scattered
throughout its laws that relate to trade secrets. It is important to

82.
See Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 11851 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (last revised
July 14, 1967) (applying to patents and trademarks); see also Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 18338
[hereinafter Berne Convention] (last revised July 24, 1971) (applying to copyrights).
TRIPs Article 2 incorporates Articles 1-12 and Article 19 of the Paris
83.
Convention applicable to patents and trademarks, and TRIPs Article 9 incorporates
Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention applicable to copyright. See TRIPs, supra note
68, arts. 2, 9.
84.
See id. art. 39 (providing for the protection of undisclosed information). The
sole provision in TRIPs related to trade secrets is contained in Article 39, which
provides in relevant part as follows:
(2) Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing
information lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by,
or used by others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest
commercial practices so long as such information:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise
configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or
readily accessible to persons within circles that normally deal with the
kind of information in questions;
(b) has commercial value because it is secrets; and
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the
person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secrets.
(3) Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical
entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of
which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair
commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against
disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are
taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.
Id. Outside of the WTO, there is no major international convention comparable to the
Paris Convention (applicable to patents and trademarks) or the Berne Convention
(applicable to copyright) that applies to trade secrets.
85.
See id. (standing alone as the sole TRIPs provision relating to the
protection of trade secrets).
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understand this fragmented legal framework in order to plan how to
best protect trade secrets in China.
A. Existing Laws Applicable to Trade Secrets
The most important law governing trade secrets is the 1993
Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL). Article 10 of the AUCL states
in relevant part:
"[Tirade secret" shall mean [1] technical and business information that
is unknown to the public, [2] can bring economics benefits to the owner
to the right owner, [3] is of a practical nature and is protected by
86
confidentiality measures taken by the rights owner.

Under this definition, trade secrets can include scientific processes,
methods, recipes, or business information. Business information can
include marketing and advertising strategies, new product
development strategies, customer lists, financial data, and terms and
prices.87 As noted earlier, the vast bulk of MNCs doing business in
China have information that falls into these categories when they
enter the Chinese market or develop such information after doing
business in China for any period of time.88 Article 10 of the AUCL
further proscribes the following acts of infringing upon trade secrets:
(1) obtaining a trade secret by theft, promise of gain, duress or any
other unfair means;
(2) disclosing, using, or permitting others to use a right owner's trade
secret that was obtained by any of the means set forth in the preceding
item; or
(3) disclosing, using, or permitting others to use a right owner's trade
secret in that operator's possession, thus violating an agreement or the
right owner's requirement to keep the trade secret confidential. 8 9

An important decision of the Supreme People's Court has
supplemented the AUCL. In 2006, the Supreme People's Court issued
the "Interpretation on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of
Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Unfair Competition" (2007
SPC Interpretation)."o When the Supreme People's Court issues
86.

See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Fan Bu Zheng Dang Jing Zheng Fa
[Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1993,
effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 10 (China) (defining what a trade secret is under the law).
commercial
87.
See Mi, supra note 69 ('Trade secrets can include ...
information like actual or potential supplier or customer lists, management techniques,
marketing, sales and advertising strategies.").
88.
See supra Part II(B).
89.
See Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC, art. 10 (defining specific
infringing activities).
90.
See Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Some Matters About
the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Unfair Competition
(promulgated by the Supreme People's Court, Jan. 12, 2007, effective Feb. 1, 2007)
(
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interpretations of laws, it is exercising legislative power and its
interpretations are considered to be authoritative and binding on
lower courts. 91 Referring specifically to Article 10 of the AUCL set
forth above, the 2007 SPC Interpretation clarified several key
elements in the AUCL definition of trade secrets, 92 including what
types of measures satisfy the requirement under the AUCL that the
trademark owner has adopted confidentiality measures to protect the
trade secret:
[A] right owner has taken confidentiality measures if the right owner has done
any of the following and it is sufficient to prevent the confidential information
from being disclosed under normal circumstances:
(1) Restricted the scope of personnel who may know of the confidential
information and disclosing the content thereof only to the relevant personnel
who must know of it;
(2) Locked up the carrier of the confidential information or taken other
precautionary measures;
(3) Placed a confidentiality mark on the carrier of the confidential information;
(4) Encrypted or encoded the confidential information;
(5) Entered into a confidentiality agreement;
(6) Restricted the visitors from entering the machinery areas, premises,
workshops, and other sites related to the confidential information or subjected
visitors to confidentiality requirements; and
(7) Taken other reasonable measures to ensure the confidentiality of the
93
information.

Note that of the measures set forth above, a written
confidentiality agreement is alone sufficient to satisfy the
requirement that the trade secrets owner has taken "confidentiality
measures" to protect the trade secret as required by Article 10 of the
AUCL. The 2007 SPC Interpretation also confirmed that customer
lists can qualify as trade secrets,94 and a trade secret that is obtained

(China) [hereinafter 2007 SPC Interpretation], available at http://www.wipo.int/edoes/
lexdocs/laws/en/cncnl04en.pdf [http://perma.cclYV79-7WBZ] (archived Sept. 28, 2014)
(providing interpretative guidance to the lower courts on how to apply the AUCL).
91.
See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 179 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA] ("The SPC acts
as a legislative body when it issues legislative interpretations that supplement and
elaborate on existing laws.").
92.
See 2007 SPC Interpretation, supra note 90, art. 11 (stating explicitly that
it is clarifying the meaning of "confidentiality measures as stipulated in Paragraph 3 of
Article 10 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law").
Id.
93.
94.
See id. art. 13 ("The name list of clients among business secrets generally
refers to the special client information that is different from related public
information.").
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through independent development or reverse engineering is lawful
and does not constitute a violation of the AUCL.9 5
In addition to the AUCL, several other laws apply to trade
secrets. Article 43 of the Contract Law generally prohibits a party
from disclosing the trade secrets that are made known during
contract negotiations regardless of whether a contract is concluded. 96
Section 3 of Chapter 18 has several provisions regulating technology
licensing, including trade secrets.9 7 Among other obligations, the
licensee must maintain confidentiality,9 8 cannot exploit the trade
secret beyond the scope permitted in the licensing agreement,9 9 and
cannot disclose the licensed trade secret to third parties.10 0 Article
149 of the Company Law provides that directors or senior
management personnel of a Chinese company are prohibited from
disclosing trade secretsto1 and are liable for damages for breach of
this obligation.10 2
Article 22 of the 1995 Labor Law provides that the parties can
include a stipulation in the labor contract that the employee will
maintain the employer's trade secrets. 0 3 Article 102 of the 1995
Labor Law states that if the employee breaches a confidentiality
obligation specified in the employment contract, and causes economic

See id. art. 12 ("As regards obtaining business secrets through development
95.
and research by itself or reverse engineering, it shall not be ascertained as an
infringement upon business secrets.").
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo He Tong Fa (
96.
[Contract Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), art. 43 (China) (prohibiting the disclosure of
trade secrets obtained during contract negotiation regardless of whether or not a
contract is formed).
97.
See id. arts. 342-43, 347-49, 351-54 (describing the requirements for a
technological transfer contract and the penalties in place for infringing on another
party's trade secrets).
98.
See id. arts. 348, 350 (establishing the duty of maintaining confidentiality
of a company's trade secrets when entering into a contract with that company).
See id. art. 351 (establishing liability when a party discloses another
99.
company's trade secrets or in some other fashion breaches the duty of maintaining
confidentiality).
See id. (establishing liability when a party allows a patent to be exploited
100.
or a technical secret to be used by a third person).
101.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Gong Si Fa (4AAARM6 1ii)
[Company Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 149(7) (China) (barring directors or senior
managers from disclosing company secrets).
102.
See id. art. 150 (making directors and senior managers who disclose
company secrets liable for company losses resulting form the disclosure).
103.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Lao Dong Fa (
A
RN'tJM-)
[Labor Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), art. 22 (China) (providing for the inclusion of
provisions in an employment contract safeguarding a company's trade secrets).
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harm to the employer, the employee is liable for damages. 104 Article
23 of the 2008 Labor Contract Law provides that the employer and
employee can include both a confidentiality clause and a noncompetition clause in the labor contract.1 05 Under a confidentiality
clause, the employee is bound to keep trade secrets confidential.
Under the non-competition clause, the employer is allowed to prevent
the employee, after termination of employment, from working for a
business that manufactures products similar to that of the former
employer or that competes with the former employer.106 Through the
non-competition clause, the employee is also prohibited from
establishing his or her own business that manufactures similar
7
products or otherwise competes with the former employer.' 0 Under
the 2008 Labor Contract Law, a non-competition agreement has a
maximum term of two years1 0 8 and must be supported by the
payment of monthly compensation.109 Since the majority of trade
secrets cases involve current or former employees who are induced to
work for a competitor, the provisions of the 2008 Labor Contract Law
are especially important in supplementing the AUCL and will be the
subject of an extended examination in a later section of this
Article."10
B. Enforcement Authorities
Several different enforcement authorities have jurisdiction over
trade secrets cases under the AUCL and other laws. The
Administration of Industry and Commerce (AIC), an administrative

See id. art. 102 (establishing liability for laborers who revoke labor
104.
contracts under specified circumstances).
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Lao Dong He Tong Fa
105.
) [Labor Contract Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the
(5)
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), art. 23
(China) (allowing for a non-competition provision in an employment contract provided
that the employer continues to pay employee during the non-compete term).
See id. art. 24 (outlining who may be subject to a non-competition provision
106.
and defining activities prohibited during the term).
See id. ("[A] person shall be subject to non-competition provisions in terms
107.
of his working for a competing Unit that either reproduces the same type of products or
is engaged in the same type of business as his current Unit, or in terms of his
establishing his own business to produce products or engage in business competing
with his current Unit's products or business . . . .").
See id. (stating that the term of a non-competition clause "shall not exceed
108.
two years").
109.
See id. art. 23 ("If a laborer has an obligation to maintain the
confidentiality of his Unit's trade secrets, the Unit may agree with the laborer on the
inclusion of non-competition provisions in the labor contract or a separate
confidentiality agreement, and stipulate that the Unit shall pay economic
compensation to the laborer on a monthly basis during the term of non-competition
after the termination of the labor contract.").
110.
See infra Part IV (discussing preventative strategies that the MNC can
take to ensure trade secrets protection).
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body, has the authority to seize products or documents, order the
infringer to cease the infringing activity, and to impose a fine of
between roughly 1,700 to 33,000 U.S. dollars. 111 The AICs, however,
have no authority to order compensatory damages or to issue
permanent injunctions. 112 The advantage of an administrative
proceeding before the AIC is speed. The AICs will, if presented with
satisfactory evidence, act in a matter of days or even immediately. In
the case of trademark counterfeiting over which the AICs also have
authority, the AICs have been known to act immediately within as
little as fifteen to thirty minutes when presented with evidence of
counterfeits.113 The plaintiff can also bring an action to enforce trade
secrets in a People's Court. The courts have the authority to issue
evidence preservation orders, issue injunctions, and award
compensatory damages.11 4 An evidence preservation order is
important because the order, usually administered directly by the
judge in person against the defendant on the suspect premises, can
preserve evidence that the defendant would otherwise likely destroy
and, as noted earlier, all Chinese authorities find, in general, that
only documentary evidence has probative value.115 The disadvantage
of proceeding in court in China is that there is no system of discovery
similar to that available under the U.S. civil litigation system. If the
plaintiff seeks an evidence preservation order, the plaintiff will need
to know, in advance of the order, about the existence of the evidence.
If the confidentiality clause protecting trade secrets is contained in an
employment contract, the case can also be brought in a labor
arbitration commission with an appeal to a People's Court.116 If the
employee is the plaintiff, the employee will often choose to bring the

111.

See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Fan Bu Zheng Dang Jing Zheng Fa
[Anti-Unfair
Competition Law of the PRC]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'1 People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1993,
effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 25 (China) ("In case a business operator violates the
provisions of Article 10 of this law and infringes upon trade secrets, the supervision
and inspection department shall order the ceasing of the illegal acts and may impose a
fine of not less than 10,000 yuan but not more than 200,000 yuan in light of the
circumstances.").
112.
See id. Nothing in the Anti-Unfair Competition Law authorizes
compensatory damages or a permanent injunction.
113.
See Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting, supra note 32, at 761 (noting that if PRC
authorities were already familiar with MNCs representatives, then PRC authorities
will often, within "fifteen minutes to half an hour, initiate a raid").
114.
See Civil Procedure Law of the PRC (promulgated Oct. 28, 2008, effective
Apr. 1, 2008, and revised on Jan. 1, 2013), art. 100 (China).
115.
See ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 28, at 865-66
(explaining that "the court may, among other things, question the respondent" and
"conduct an inspection of [the] premises" to ensure evidence preservation).
116.
See Labor Arbitration Law of the PRC, art. 5 (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 2007, effective May 1, 2008) (China) (stating that
if the parties are not willing to have a consultation or if the consultation fails, then
they can submit an application for mediation to a mediation institute).
(
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case in a labor arbitration commission, which is viewed as more
sympathetic to employees.' 1 7 For the same reason, employers will
usually choose to go directly to court to enforce the trade secret under
the AUCL, rather than choose labor arbitration.' 1 8
Unlike many other countries, China also has criminal penalties
for breach of trade secrets. Article 219 of the Chinese Criminal Law
imposes criminal liability on anyone who discloses or acquires a trade
secret by illegal means when the act causes "serious" or
"exceptionally serious" losses to the owner of the trade secret.1 19 All
criminal cases are initiated and conducted by the Chinese police, the
Public Security Bureau (PSB).120 Criminal cases are prosecuted in a
People's Court by a procuratorate.121 A major advantage of pursuing
a criminal case is that the PSB has wide investigatory powers at its
disposal in all criminal cases, including the abilities to make an
inquest on site, seize documents, inspect the premises, and issue
orders to the defendant to produce information. 122 Most defendants
do not feel safe ignoring PSB investigatory powers.1 23 These powers,
and the fact that trade secrets can be protected by criminal actions,
are especially important in light of the lack of a discovery system in
China in civil cases. 124 Bringing a criminal action, however, has other
problems that are highlighted in the discussion below.

117.
See ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 28, at 855
("According to statistics, employees win or partially win in most labor arbitrations.").
See id.
118.
119.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Xing Fa (9AtUNDIRilPJ*)
[Criminal Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), art. 219 (China) (stating the different levels of
punishment for infringing on business secrets, ranging from fixed-term imprisonment
of no more than three years for causing "heavy losses" to fixed-term imprisonment of
three to seven years for "especially serious" infringements). The statute does not
further define "serious" or "especially serious" offenses, leaving it to the discretion of
the Public Security Bureau.
See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 91, at 263 ("The Ministry
120.
of Public Security, under the State Council, has overall responsibility for the police
force of the PRC. At the local level, among other police functions, public security
bureaus generally handle the first stages of the criminal process in the PRC.").
121.
See id. at 218 ("The procuratorate, modeled on the institution of the
procuracy in the former Soviet Union, performs the tasks of approving arrests by the
public security organs and prosecuting criminal cases . . . .").
122.
See id. at 263-64 (discussing the powers of the police in the investigatory
stage).
123.
See id. at 263-65 (noting that these investigative powers of the PSB are
backed by various coercive measures, such as detention, interrogation, and arrest).
124.
See Mark Cohen, "Case Filing" in China's Courts and Their Impact on IP
Cases, CHINA IPR (Mar. 24, 2012) (noting the "lack of discovery type procedures for all
civil cases in China"), http://chinaipr.com/2012/03/24/case-filing-in-chinas-courts-andtheir-impact-on-ip-cases [http://perma.cc/A9ED-FL7E] (archived Sept. 2, 2014).
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C. High Evidentiary Burden and Traps in the Enforcement Process
The 2007 SPC Interpretation of the Anti-Unfair Competition
Law, discussed above, also sets forth the burden of proof in a trade
secrets case:
Where a party alleges that another infringes its trade secret, the party
shall bear the burden of proof [1] as to the fact that the trade secret it
has possessed is in conformity to the statutory requirements, [2] that
the other party's information is identical or substantially identical to its
25
trade secret and [3] that the other party has adopted unfair means.1

Step one in the burden of proof requires the plaintiff to prove
that it owns a trade secret as defined by statutory requirements set
forth in Article 10 of the AUCL.1 26 Step two requires the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant has the trade secret in its possession.12 7
Step three requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant has
obtained the trade secret by illegal means.12 8
In order to prove step one, the plaintiff must prove that it owns a
trade secret by demonstrating that its information satisfies the
statutory requirements of a trade secret as set forth in Article 10 of
the AUCL-that there exists technical and business information
unknown to the public, that the information has economic and
practical value, and that the owner has taken measures to maintain
confidentiality. Step one is frequently disputed. 129 The existence of
technical and business information that can qualify as a trade secret
is the most heavily disputed element in the AUCL statutory
definition. 30 The second element, economic and practical value of the
information, is almost never disputed.'13 The third element can be

125.
2007 SPC Interpretation, supra note 90, art. 17.
126.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Fan Bu Zheng Dang Jing Zheng Fa
( iA
*f4051FEER*2)[Anti-Unfair
Competition Law of the PRC]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1993,
effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 10 (China) ("'Trade Secrets' mentioned in this Article refers
to any technology information or business operation information which is unknown to
the public, can bring about economic benefits to the obligee, has practical utility and
about which the obligee has adopted secret-keeping measures.").
127.
See 2007 SPC Interpretation, supra note 90, art. 17 (defining the second
requirement of the burden of proof in trade secrets cases).
128.
See Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC, supra note 126 (discussing
the means by which a business operator is prohibited from infringing upon trade
secrets).
129.
See id. (defining "trade secrets").
130.
See ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 28, at 856-57
(identifying the requirements and indicating that "requirement (2) is almost never
disputed. Requirement (3) is often disputed. The most heavily disputed issue is
requirement (1)").
131.
See id.
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satisfied by a confidentiality agreement alone or other measures set
forth in the 2007 SPC Interpretation.' 3 2
The first issue-the existence of technical and business
information that can constitute a trade secret-is heavily disputed
and can be a troublesome issue for an MNC. A comparison between
the enforcement of trademarks and trade secrets can be a useful
guide to understanding the issue. In a trademark dispute, the owner
proves its ownership of a trademark by the mere act of submitting to
the enforcement authorities a copy of the trademark registration
certificate issued by the China Trademark Office.13 3 As noted earlier,
China has an official registration system for trademarks. If the MNC
submits a copy of the trademark certificate, the MNC submits proof
that it owns the trademark. If the MNC's FIE is a licensee of the
trademark, the representatives of the joint venture or WFOE may
need to produce both a copy of the trademark certificate in the name
of the MNC and a copy of the licensing agreement that authorizes the
joint venture or WFOE to enforce the trademark on behalf of the
MNC.1 34 By contrast, China has no registration system for trade
secrets, so proving the existence of a trade secret can be a far more
difficult burden.' 3 5 If the MNC has a written licensing agreement
that sets forth the trade secret in detail, as recommended in Part II
above, the MNC should submit a copy to the Chinese enforcement
authorities. Chinese authorities almost always insist on documentary
evidence because they are fearful of acting outside their scope of
authority. If the MNC has no documentary evidence at all of the
existence of the trade secret, the MNC might find that the authorities
will refuse to accept the case. If the MNC has documentary evidence
that is general in nature, such as a general clause in a labor contract
that refers to confidential information without details about the
nature of the information, the Chinese authorities might also be

132.
See 2007 SPC Interpretation, supra note 90, art. 11(7) ("It shall be
determined that a right owner has taken any confidentiality measures if the right
owner has . . . (7) [t]aken other reasonable measures to ensure the confidentiality of the
information.").
A
5liT1)
[Trademark Law of the PRC] (promulgated
133.
See (r4
Aug. 30, 2014, effective May 1, 2014), ch. 1, art. 3 (China) ("A trademark registrant
shall be entitled to the exclusive right to use the registered trademark and such right
shall be protected by law."). The revised 2014 Trademark Law amends and replaces the
2001 Trademark Law. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the PRC
Trademark Law will refer to the 2014 Trademark Law.
134.
The licensing agreement should include a provision that authorizes the
licensee to enforce the trademark rights on behalf of the trademark owner, the MNC.
However, based on the author's own working experience in China, the author has found
that the Chinese authorities usually do not even ask to see a copy of the licensing
agreement. The authorities seem to assume that if the MNC owns the trademark, its
joint venture or WFOE has the right to enforce the trademark on behalf of the MNC.
135.
See Ong, supra note 8 (noting the lack of a formal registration system for
trade secrets with Chinese authorities) .
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reluctant to move without further documentary evidence. The best
scenario is to present a document, such as a licensing agreement,
with details on the scope of the confidentiality obligation and with the
technical or business information set forth in detail.
In some cases, even if the MNC has a written document, the
Chinese enforcement authorities might still be reluctant to move
forward without written certification that a trade secret violation
exists from an approved state-owned technology consultancy
organization.' 3 6 This is easily understood by noting that the second
element in the burden of proof set forth in the 2007 SPC
Interpretation is that "the other party's information is identical or
substantially identical to its trade secret." For example, suppose that
the MNC has used a written agreement to license a chemical process
to its Chinese business entity and now believes that a former
employee has stolen the chemical process and has gone to work for a
competitor. Suppose further that the MNC has decided to bring a
criminal enforcement action through the PSB because the PSB has
the power to order the defendant to produce internal documents.
While the PSB is empowered to investigate economic crimes, the PSB
does not have expertise in trade secrets involving advanced
technology, such as a chemical process or a product design. To move
forward with the trade secrets investigation, the PSB will entrust the
trade secrets issue to a state-owned technology research institute or
consultancy organization to determine the first two steps of the
burden of proof set forth by the 2007 SPC Interpretation: (1) whether
the plaintiff owns technical and business information and (2) whether
the defendant has possession of the identical or substantially similar
information. 37 Such a process can take months and be quite complex;
the state-owned research institute may have to engage in extensive
tests and analysis of the two chemical processes to determine
whether they are identical or substantially the same. If the case had
been brought in a civil court, instead of as a criminal case, the civil
court might have to rely on the same analysis as the court may find
that it lacks the expertise to make such a comparison on its own. If
the state-owned technology institute determines that the first two
evidentiary steps have been met-that the MNC owns technical and
business information and that defendant possesses identical or
substantially similar information-then the state-owned technology
institute will issue a report with such a finding to the PSB. The MNC

136.
For the list of approved technology appraisal organizations, see the Sup.
People's Ct., Reply to China Science and Technology Consultancy Service Center about
"Report of Application for Incorporation of Judicial Appraisal Institution into the
Roster" (Apr. 9, 2003).
137.
See 2007 SPC Interpretation, supra note 90, art. 14 (setting forth the
burden of proof in a trade secret case).
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must then still prove the third step in the burden of proof, that the
defendant obtained the information by illegal means.
1.

Enforcement of Trademarks and Trade Secrets

Before examining some of the treacherous pitfalls and traps
involved in this process, compare the enforcement of trademarks, also
viewed as part of the law of unfair competition and covered by the
AUCL,1 38 with the enforcement of trade secrets. In a typical case
involving either trademark counterfeiting or substantial but not
identical copying, the MNC will also approach a local branch of the
AIC, which has enforcement authority over trademarks, as well as
trade secrets.13 9 The MNC will display a copy of its trademark
registration certificate issued by the China Trademark Office,
conclusive proof of its ownership of the trademark. The MNC will also
then give the AIC officials some samples of counterfeits or knock-offs
of its trademarked product that it has purchased from some nearby
location. The MNC will then state that the samples are unauthorized
counterfeits or knock-offs. Note that these two simple steps allow the
MNC to assert a claim of trademark counterfeiting or infringement:
(1) a copy of its trademark registration certificate and (2) a statement
from a representative of the MNC that the knock-offs are
unauthorized.
Convincing the authorities to act is often facilitated by the use of
private investigators. Many private investigators have already built a
relationship with the AIC through previous enforcement actions. In
many cases, especially if the private investigators know the local
authorities, these simple steps, which can be accomplished in as little
as half an hour, are all that is necessary to trigger a raid by the AIC
of the suspected premises where the counterfeits are made. In half an
hour or less after the initial discussion, AIC officials, accompanied by
the private investigator and representatives from the MNC
trademark owner, will get into a government vehicle, and, once in the
vehicle, the investigators will give the officials directions to the
suspect premises. The investigators will wait until all AIC officials
are in the vehicle and en route to reveal the location in order to avoid
tip-offs. Once the AIC officials reach the premises, a raid occurs in
which the counterfeits or infringing products are seized.
The speed with which the enforcement action occurs is one of the
major attractions of this method,140 but the speed is due to two

138.
Trademarks are also governed by the 2014 Trademark Law of the PRC,
supra note 133.
139.
The following procedures are based upon the author's own experience in
enforcing trademarks and trade secrets while working as an in-house counsel for an
MNC in China.
140.
While the enforcement action is expeditious, the problem lies in the
penalties. In most cases, the penalties are so light that they do not create any
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factors that significantly distinguish trademark cases from trade
secrets cases. First, proof of ownership of a trademark is
accomplished by simply presenting a copy of the trademark
registration certificate. This is not possible in the case of trade secrets
since no registration system for trade secrets exist. 141 The MNC must
prove it owns trade secrets by submitting internal documents that
may, or may not, be persuasive to enforcement authorities without
outside verification by a state-owned technology institute. Second, the
proof of an infringement of a trademark right can be accomplished by
the MNC trademark owner's statement-sometimes an oral
statement is sufficient-that the counterfeits or knock-offs are
unauthorized copies.142 The Chinese authorities will accept the
MNC's statement that the counterfeits are unauthorized copies and
can, by a simple visual comparison of the counterfeits with the
genuine products and the trademark certificate provided by the MNC,
determine that an infringement has occurred. This simple process
stands in stark contrast to the complex and time-consuming process
involved in proving a trade secrets violation to the AIC or the PSB.
While the need to have the existence of the trade secrets and its
infringement verified by a state-owned research institute is alone an
additional and time-consuming burden, many MNCs will find that
there are some additional legal risks involved in the verification
process. The PSB is charged with enforcement against all crimes but
always places priorities on violent crimes. The PSB may have little
interest in economic crimes, unless these economic crimes result in
harm to the public (e.g., counterfeit liquor or baby formula that can
result in deaths to consumers) or threaten national security (e.g.,
smuggling). The PSB might have little interest in investigating a
trade secrets case involving an MNC where the only harm is that an
MNC with deep pockets is losing profits. In these cases, the PSB has
been known to ask for "case fees," a cash payment of approximately
10,000 U.S. dollars, depending on the case,143 for accepting the case.
Case fees are used ostensibly to reimburse the PSB for expenses
incurred in the investigation. Case fees are technically illegal under

deterrence to further illegal activity but, in fact, might have the opposite effect, inciting
even more counterfeiting. See Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting,supra note 32, at 759, 765-76
(discussing flaws with the current enforcement approach and noting that "[t]he overall
picture . . . is that there is a torrent of enforcement activity in China, but with little or
no deterrence.").
141.
See Ong, supra note 8 (stating that trade secrets are "not formally
registered with government authorities").
142.
This observation is based on the author's own experience in working with
AIC enforcement authorities in China.
143.
When the author was working on a trade secrets case as an in-house
counsel in China, the author experienced first-hand being asked for a case fee by the
PSB.
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Chinese law,144 although they are common when MNCs seek police
help in investigating certain "victimless" economic crimes, that is
crimes like counterfeiting or trade secrets where no person has been
injured and the issue is one of economic losses suffered by the MNC.
Given the recent heightened concern with bribery of foreign officials
under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), a U.S.-based
MNC might also be at risk for an FCPA investigation by the U.S.
Department of Justice for such a cash payment to the PSB.145
Even if the PSB accepts the case, the PSB may be unwilling to
proceed with the investigation unless the existence of the trade
secrets and its possession of the identical or similar information by
the defendant are verified by a judicial appraisal report from an
approved
state-owned
technology
appraisal
consultancy
organization.14 6 In any case involving complex trade secrets, the PSB
will lack the expertise to determine if a trade secret exists and has
been stolen but will likely seek an expert's report. If the trade secrets
need to be examined by a state-owned technology appraisal
consultancy organization, the organization will also be entitled to
charge an appraisal fee in accordance with Chinese law.' 47 If the PSB
accepts the case and entrusts the case to the state-owned technology
appraisal consultancy organization to do an analysis of the trade
secrets, the PSB, as the entrusting authority, should pay the
appraisal fee.14 8 However, in practice, the PSB will usually ask the
MNC to pay the appraisal fee.149 If the MNC pays a fee on behalf of
the PSB that should have been paid by the PSB, then that act

144.
Charging case fees is illegal under PRC law. See Article II of the Circular of
the Ministry of Public Security on Prohibition of Demanding Money and Valuable from
All Parties and Supporters during Criminal Case Proceeding, Notice No. 725 (1998) ("It
is strictly prohibited to charge all parties during criminal processing in various names.
It is not allowed to accept the case processing fee paid by the interested parties in
various names for any reason. Where commission may be or is permitted during case
processing as previously provided, immediate rectification shall be carried out. Any
violation against provisions shall be investigated and punished strictly.").
See Daniel Chow, China Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2012
145.
Wis. L. REV. 574 (2012) (highlighting the recent rise in FCPA cases involving China).
See Sup. People's Ct., Reply to China Science and Technology Consultancy
146.
Service Center, supra note 136 (offering a selected list of approved technology appraisal
organizations).
147.
See Decree of Ministry of Justice on General Rules on the Procedures for
Judicial Appraisal, art. 8 (promulgated July 18, 2007, effective on Oct. 1, 2007) ("The
judicial appraisal institutions shall uniformly charge for the judicial appraisal fees.
The charging items and standards shall be subject to relevant national provisions.").
148.
See id. arts. 8, 11 (indicating that the technology consultancy organization
can charge a fee (Article 8), that the organization must be entrusted with the appraisal
(Article 11), and that the entrusting party must pay the judicial appraisal fee as it is
the entrusting party that requests the appraisal).
149.
This observation is based upon the author's own working experience in
China.
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appears to be in violation of Chinese law' 5 0 and may also implicate
issues under the FCPA.1 ' If the MNC refuses to pay the appraisal
fee on behalf of the PSB and the state-owned research institute
refuses to issue an expert's report, then the PSB will take no further
action in investigating the case.' 5 2 In addition, it is possible that the
research institute will pressure the MNC for additional payments
beyond the regular appraisal fee in order to secure a favorable
result.15 3 It is also possible that both the PSB and the research
institute will ask for more payments if additional, unexpected steps
are required.' 5 4 These considerations indicate that an MNC could
become ensnared in a web of questionable legality involving repeated
demands for payments once the MNC seeks help from the PSB and a
technical analysis of the trade secrets and their infringement as part
of its burden of proof.
2.

Legal Risks in Enforcing Trade Secrets

The discussion above indicates that MNCs seeking to enforce
their trade secrets are faced with some daunting risks. In a typical
scenario, the MNC finds that an ex-employee, armed with trade
secrets from his former employer, has accepted, or is about to accept,
employment with a competitor. If the MNC chooses to use
administrative authorities, the AICs have limited investigatory
powers, have no authority to award compensatory damages, and have
no authority to issue an injunction permanently preventing the
employee from disclosing trade secrets. 15 5 If the MNC files a civil
court action, the MNC will find that there is no civil discovery system,

150.
See Article II of the Ministry of Public Security Notice No. 725, supra note
144 (stating that it is illegal for the PSB to "accept the case processing fee paid by the
interested parties in various names for any reason."). If the PSB is required to pay a
judicial appraisal fee and the PSB asks the MNC to pay the judicial appraisal fee in
what guise, then the PSB appears to be in violation of Article II of Notice No. 725. Id.
151.
See Chow, China Under the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, supra note 145,
at 595-96 ("The DOJ might find that MNCs are knowingly making payments to third
parties who will then pass on the payments to PRC officials and might consider this
practice to be an FCPA violation.").
152.
This observation is based upon the author's own experience in dealing with
the PSB while working in China as an in-house counsel for an MNC.
153.
This observation is based upon the author's own experience working as an
in-house counsel for an MNC in China when dealing with a state-owned technology
consultancy service.
154.
When working in China, the author found that once an MNC submits to a
demand for payment, additional demands for payment often follow.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Fan Bu Zheng Dang Jing Zheng Fa
155.
(1:A#fiflkFIEER12)
[Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1993,
effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 10 (China) (setting forth the legal liability of the infringer
where the remedies available to the supervision and inspection department do not
include compensatory damages and the ability to issue permanent injunctions).
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so it will be difficult to obtain documentary evidence of the theft of
the trade secret in the hands of the former employee.15 6 This lack of
documentary evidence may mean that the MNC will be unable to
meet its high burden of proof in trade secret cases. 157 If the MNC files
a criminal case with the PSB, the MNC may be faced with demands
for an illicit case fee.15 8 In either a civil case or a criminal case, the
authorities may require a report from an approved state-owned
research institute since the enforcement authorities themselves lack
the technical expertise concerning the trade secret. When a stateowned research institute is used, the Chinese authorities who should
pay the fee may pass on the payment to the MNC and the consulting
organization may demand additional payments beyond authorized
fees to issue a report. All of these actions leave the MNC embroiled in
a web of illegal acts for which it may face civil and criminal liability
under both Chinese and U.S. law.
These daunting problems can be traced, in part, to the high
evidentiary burden in trade secrets cases. The plaintiff is required to
satisfy three steps, all by the use of documentary evidence: (1) the
plaintiff owned a trade secret; (2) the defendant has obtained, or is
using, the identical or substantial similar trade secret; and (3) the
defendant obtained the trade secret through illegal means.1 59 Any
document evidence of elements (2) and (3) are likely to be within the
possession of the defendant, but Chinese civil law does not permit the
use of discovery to obtain such evidence. 60 The courts will likely
accept only documentary evidence and will not accept witness
testimony to prove these elements.' 6 ' These evidentiary hurdles leave
some MNCs with no choice but to seek the help of the PSB.1 62 State-

156.
See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 91, at 288 (discussing the
minimal discovery procedures available to litigants in China).
157.
See supra Part III.C (discussing the high evidentiary burdens and traps in
the enforcement process).
158.
See id.
159.
See 2007 SPC Interpretation, supra note 90, art. 14 (stating the burden of
proof set forth by the 2007 SPC Interpretation).
160.
See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 91, at 288 ("Pre-trial
discovery in civil litigation in China is minimal as compared with the United
States. ... There is little, if any, exchange of evidence between the parties and PRC
litigants do not have access to coercive measures such as interrogatories, depositions,
and document requests. . . .").
161.
See ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 28, at 865-66
(explaining where there is conflicting witness testimony in a case, both will be
disregarded, and where an employer invites a current employee to testify against a
former employee, the testimony is also disregarded because the current employee is
deemed to have an interest related to his employer).
162.
This observation is based upon the author's own experience working in
China with the PSB.
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owned research institutes are also known to demand illegal
payments.163

While China has pledged to consider legislative reforms for trade
secrets in 2014,164 MNCs would be ill-advised to expect that these
reforms will eliminate the major problems in enforcing trade secrets.
While U.S. companies have made recommendations for legislative
reform,165 there is, of course, no guarantee that the Chinese
government will accept these recommendations. In addition, one
major reason why enforcing trade secrets is full of traps is
government corruption, which is a pervasive problem that affects
MNCs in all areas of doing business in China and can be traced to the
fundamental political issue of the concentration of power in China's
government and ruling Communist Party.166 Although China has
announced a serious crackdown on government corruption and
bribery, many are skeptical that the Communist Party will enact any
fundamental reforms that will erode its power.167 The best strategy is
to accept the existing legal framework and to develop a strategy to
protect trade secrets in light of existent legal limitations. The next
Part of this Article focuses on how MNCs can protect their trade
secrets under the present legal framework.

IV. PREVENTATIVE MEASURES

The evidentiary burdens involved in proving a trade secrets case
and the risks of involving the PSB and a state-owned technology
appraisal consultancy organization make the effective use of
preventative measures even more important in all trade secrets

163.
This observation is based upon the author's own experience in China
working with technology consulting organizations.
164.
This announcement was made at the conclusion of the meeting of the highlevel U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade. See U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, supra note 11 ("The United States and China commit to cooperate in 2014
on proposals to amend the trade secret law and on related legislative and policy issues.
China shall give serious consideration to U.S. legislative reform proposals.").
165.
See U.S.-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 2-3 (discussing
recommendations for enforcing agreements through drafting a unified trade secret law
and prioritizing revisions to the AUCL).
166.
See generally Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China's Crackdown on Commercial
Bribery Threatens U.S. Multinational Companies Doing Business in China, 31 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2014).
167.
See William Wan, China's New Leaders Discuss Fight Against Corruption,
but Some are Skeptical of Action, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2012), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/worldlasiapacific/chinas-new-leaders-focus-onfighting-corruption/2012/12/27/9953e00a-4f77-11e2-950a-7863a013264b-story.html
[http://perma.cc/N7Q4GSQ] (archived Sept. 2, 2014) (noting that real change requires
creating new institutions that put "checks and balances" into the political system but
that there has been little appetite for such move within the government).
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cases. 6 8 Once the MNC finds that a trade secret has been stolen, the
MNC will find meeting the evidentiary burdens in China to be timeconsuming, frustrating, and potentially involving questionable cash
payments. A preventative strategy should implement measures that
anticipate these problems and avoid them, if possible. Since trade
secrets cases in China commonly involve theft by existing or former
employees, the MNC should plan its preventative strategies with a
focus on employer-employee relations.
A. Licensing and ConfidentialityAgreement
An MNC should sign a written licensing agreement with its
FIE.169 This agreement should set forth, in detail, the nature and
scope of the trade secrets. 170 The purpose of the licensing agreement
is to establish documentary evidence of the existence and ownership
of the trade secret by the MNC, the first step in the burden of proof of
any trade secrets case. 171 The licensing agreement should be drafted
to set out the scope of the trade secret in technical detail. Detail will
help avoid any doubts about whether the stolen information falls
within the protected knowledge if a dispute arises.1 72
An MNC should then require that all existing employees with
access to any confidential information sign a confidentiality
agreement. 7 3 The agreement can be referenced in the labor contract,
but a separate detailed confidentiality agreement should be signed in
addition to the labor contract. Use of a written confidential

168.
For a similar recommendation, see Bai & Da, supra note 12, at 365-71
(recommending confidentiality policies and confidentiality and non-competition
agreements as preventative measures for the protection of trade secrets in China).
169.
See id. at 368 ("Due to the high evidentiary burden in China, written
agreements are vital in protecting trade secrets and confidential information.").
170.
See id. ("Whenever possible, confidentiality agreements should clearly
identify the information that the employer deems as confidential.").
171.
See supra text accompanying note 169; see also Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong
[AntiHe Guo Fan Bu Zheng Dang Jing Zheng Fa (
Unfair Competition Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l
People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 10 (China) (prohibiting
business operators from infringing upon trade secrets in various ways); 2007 SPC
Interpretation, supra note 90, art. 14 (setting forth the burden of proof in trade secrets
cases).
172.
See Bai & Da, supra note 12, at 365 (recommending that companies
establish confidentiality policies "[cllearly spelling out the consequences of any
unauthorized, improper use, or disclosure of confidential information.").
173.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Lao Dong He Tong Fa
[Labor Contract Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the
(P*AAR#0M 97 JA R)
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), art. 23
(China) ("[T]he Unit may agree with the laborer on the inclusion of non-competition
provisions in the labor contract or a separate confidentiality agreement."); Bai & Da,
supra note 12, at 366 (recommending that a company "[r]equire all key personnel who
have knowledge of trade secrets to sign confidentiality agreements").
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agreement is important even though an analysis of the laws
governing trade secrets in Part III of this Article indicates that the
obligation of confidentiality may exist for employees even without a
confidentiality agreement. This would occur, for example, if the
employer uses other measures specified by the 2007 SPC
Interpretation, such as passwords or marking information as
confidential. 174 The Company Law indicates that senior management
employees have a fiduciary duty to keep trade secrets confidential.17 5
A similar duty may be the basis for the obligation of a lower-level
employee to keep information confidential when other confidentiality
measures are used. However, under the Company Law, the senior
management employee's duty to keep information confidential exists
only when the employee continues to work for the employer; 176 once
the employment is terminated, the duty of confidentiality ends since
the fiduciary duty to the employer also ends.' 7 7 The same should hold
true for lower-level employees: the duty of confidentiality created by
protective measures taken by the employer ends when employment
ends. The only way to extend the confidentiality obligation after the
termination of employment is through the use of a confidentiality
agreement. 7 8 This is what distinguishes the confidentiality
agreement from all of the other measures set forth in the 2007 SPC
Interpretation. None of the other confidentiality measures set forth in
the 2007 SPC Interpretation have any effect after termination of
employment. Moreover, the confidentiality agreement does not
require any compensation to be paid to the employee in order to be
enforceable,' 79 and the agreement can extend the confidentiality

174.
See 2007 SPC Interpretation, supra note 90, art. 11 (listing different means
an employer may use to protect company information, including tagging classified
information or adopting passwords or codes on classified information).
175.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Gong Si Fa (rPA)AR615)
[Company Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), arts. 148-49 (China) (discussing fiduciary
obligations of a director and the various acts in which a director or senior manager is
not allowed to participate).
176.
See id. (providing restrictions on senior management employee conduct).
177.
See id. (apparently restricting senior management employee conduct only
throughout the duration of said employment).
178.
See Bai & Da, supra note 12, at 368 ("Chinese law does not prescribe any
fixed term during which an employee must keep the trade secret confidential, but a
court may prolong the obligation until the general public is aware of the trade secret.
Therefore, employers should consider specifying a reasonable time limit for
maintaining confidentiality obligations post-termination in all IP agreements,
consultant agreements, and service agreements that the companies may have with its
employees, contractors, and subcontractors, etc.").
179.
See Labor Contract Law of the PRC, art. 23 ("If a laborer has an obligation
to maintain the confidentiality of his Unit's trade secrets, the Unit may agree with the
laborer on the inclusion of non-competition provisions . . . and stipulate that the Unit
shall pay economic compensation .. . during the term of non-competition .... .").
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obligation indefinitely so long as the trade secret is not publically
disclosed.18 0
An MNC should be careful to ensure that its employee signs the
labor contract and the confidentiality agreement with the FIE and
not directly with the MNC. Under Chinese law, the MNC cannot
directly employ a Chinese national within China; only a Chinese legal
entity, like an FIE, can employ a Chinese national.' 8 1 If the employee
signs a confidentiality agreement directly with the MNC, a Chinese
court might find that, since the confidentiality agreement is derived
from an employment relationship, the lack of a lawful employment
relationship will void the confidentiality agreement. The lack of an
ability to directly employ Chinese nationals in China is one reason
why all MNCs that do business in China form FIEs, such as a joint
venture or a WFOE. The confidentiality agreement should be
carefully drafted so that it covers in detail the scope and nature of the
trade secrets owned by the MNC and licensed to its Chinese business
entity.
Not only should the MNC have the employee sign a
confidentiality agreement with its FIE, but the employee should also
be required to sign documents acknowledging receipt of business
secrets on a regular basis during the course of his employment. 182
The document acknowledging receipt of business information should
be kept in permanent records by the FIE and can be offered as
evidence that the employee has possession of the MNC's trade
secrets. Note that with these two documents, the MNC might be able
to satisfy the first two steps in the burden of proof in a trade secrets
case:183 the signed confidentiality agreement provides documentary
evidence of the existence and ownership of a trade secret by the MNC,

See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Fan Bu Zheng Dang Jing Zheng Fa
[Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1993,
effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 10 (China) (providing prohibited means of infringing upon
trade secrets and defining trade secrets as "any technology information or business
operation information which is unknown to the public"); see also Bai & Da, supra note
12, at 368 (suggesting that along with specifying a time limit in a confidentiality
agreement, "[a]nother option is to specify that the post-termination obligation
continues so long as the trade secrets remain secret").
181.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Lao Dong Fa ( PAAAM9M1)
[Labor Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), art. 2 (China) (stating that the PRC labor laws
apply to "enterprises, individually-owned economic organizations, and labourers who
form a labour relationship with them...."); Labor Contract Law of the PRC, art. 2
(stating that the PRC labor contract laws apply to "enterprises, individual economic
entities and private non-enterprise organizations").
182.
See Bai & Da, supra note 12, at 366 (stating that companies should "require
all employees to sign a written acknowledgement prior to receiving any company
information").
183.
See 2007 SPC Interpretation, supra note 90, art. 14 (setting forth the
burden of proof in a trade secrets case).
180.

(
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and the signed acknowledgement by the employee is documentary
evidence that the employee has obtained possession of the MNC's
trade secrets.
B. Non-Competition Agreements
The MNC should have the employee sign a non-competition
agreement in addition to a confidentiality agreement.184 The 2008
Labor Contract Law makes clear that a non-competition agreement is
separate and distinct from a confidentiality agreement. 8 5 While the
confidentiality agreement imposes a duty on the employee to prevent
disclosure of trade secrets, the non-competition agreement prohibits
the former employee from accepting employment from a competitor
after the termination of employment.186 One common rationale for
preventing a former employee from working for a competitor is that
the former employee will inevitably reveal trade secrets even if the
former employee has signed a confidentiality agreement.'8 7
Under Article 23 of the Labor Contract Law, senior management,
senior technical personnel, and other personnel under a
confidentiality obligation can be asked to sign a non-competition
agreement with the employer.' 8 8 The employer must be careful to
draft the non-competition clause so that it is not too broad. Article 24
of the Labor Contract Law requires that the scope, territory, and
term of the non-competition clause be agreed upon by the employer
and employee.18 9 Non-competition
clauses
are inherently
anticompetitive,19 0 so a clause that prohibits the employee from

184.
See Bai & Da, supra note 12, at 369 (recommending non-compete
agreements as preventative measures for the protection of trade secrets in China and
discussing such agreements in terms of Articles 23 and 24 of the Labor Contract Law).
185.
See Labor Contract Law of the PRC, art. 23 ("If a laborer has an obligation
to maintain the confidentiality of his Unit's trade secrets, the Unit may agree with the
laborer on the inclusion of non-competition provisions in the labor contract or a
separate confidentiality agreement . . . .").
186.
See id. (stating that the laborer may be prevented from "working for a
competing Unit that either produces the same type of products or is engaged in the
same type of business as his current Unit" for a period of up to two years).
187.
This reasoning is the basis for the inevitable disclosure doctrine under U.S.
law. Under this doctrine, an employer can enjoin a former employee from working for a
competitor on the ground that the employee will inevitably disclose trade secrets
obtained from his former place of employment. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. V.Redmond, 54
F.3d 1262, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Illinois trade secrets law). The doctrine is
well accepted under U.S. law. See Applicability of Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
Barring Employment of Competitor's Former Employee, 36 A.L.R. 6th 537 (2008)
(collecting cases).
188.
See Labor Contract Law of the PRC, arts. 23-24.
189.
See id. art. 24 ("The scope, territory and term of the non-competition
provisions shall be agreed upon by the Unit and the laborer, and such agreement shall
not violate laws and regulations.").
190.
See Pagnattaro, ProtectingKnow-How, supra note 9, at 333 (quoting Beijing
Hekang Scientific and Technical Development Company Ltd. and Li Zimin (2005),
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working anywhere in China, for example, would probably be rejected
as too broad.19 The non-competition agreement can prevent the
former employee from working for an employer who manufactures
products or engages in business that competes with the former
employer, and can also prevent the former employee from forming his
or her own business that competes with that of the former
employer.' 9 2 The maximum term of the non-competition clause is two
years.1 93 The employer must pay compensation to the employee on a
monthly basis in order for the non-competition clause to be
enforceable.194
Until 2013, the issue of the amount of required compensation
under a non-competition agreement was a source of widespread
confusion in China because different local jurisdictions had different
requirements.' 9 5 In 2013, the Supreme People's Court issued the
"Interpretation on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of Law
in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases" 196 (2013 SPC Interpretation),
which now sets uniform national guidelines. The 2013 SPC
Interpretation states that, where the employer and employee have

Haidian District People's Court of Beijing, Hai Min Chu No. 5598 (China)) (arguing
that a non-compete agreement "objectively restricts a 'person's right to work and
freedom to participate in the market competition,"' so these agreements must be
limited in scope and the company must demonstrate a justified business interest for
the agreement).
191.
See id. ("[N]on-compete agreements must be limited in their scope to a
reasonable time period, limited to those with knowledge of trade secrets, and applied
only to information that is legally a trade secret.").
192.
See id. (further defining the contours of the scope of permissible noncompete agreements).
193.
See Labor Contract Law of the PRC, art. 24 ("The term . . . shall not exceed
two years."). Why limit the term of the non-competition agreement to two years? Noncompetition agreements are inherently anticompetitive since they limit the freedom of
employees to earn a living and thus should be supported by a strong rationale. See
Pagnattaro, Protecting Know-How, supra note 9, at 333. Protection of trade secrets is
an accepted justification. See id. But since all trade secrets lose commercial value with
the passage of time, the thought is that after two years the harm to the employer
caused by any disclosure of a trade secret is outweighed by the employee's right to be
free from any restrictions on where he can work. See id.
194.
See Labor Contract Law of the PRC, art. 23 ("[T]he Unit may agree with
the laborer on the inclusion of non-competition provisions .. . and stipulate that the
Unit shall pay economic compensation to the laborer on a monthly basis during the
term of non-competition after the termination of the labor contract.").
195.
See ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 28, at 862-64
(stating that "[tihe amount of non-compete compensation is largely governed by
regional regulations" and detailing the "confusing" variation in mandatory minimum
non-compete compensation amounts in different regions).
196.
Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court of Several Issues on the
Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases (promulgated by the Supreme
People's Court, Dec. 31, 2012, effective Feb. 1, 2013) (China) [hereinafter 2013 SPC
Interpretation], available at http://www.chinaemployment.com.cn/shownews.asp?id=108
[http://perma.cc/TA4VZN95] (archived Sept. 2, 2014); see also Bai & Da, supra note 12, at
369 (discussing the 2013 SPC Interpretation and its implications on non-compete
agreements).
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agreed upon a non-competition clause but not on the amount of
compensation, the employee shall be entitled to monthly
compensation of 30 percent of his or her average salary for the
twelve-month period prior to termination, so long as the employee has
fulfilled the non-competition obligation.1 97 If the employer has not
paid compensation for three months after the termination of the
employment, the employee is entitled to have the non-competition
clause cancelled by a court.' 9 8 If the employer pays compensation on a
monthly basis, the employer is entitled to have a court issue an order
that the employee must comply with the non-competition clause for
the two-year period.199

C. Use of Preventative Measures to Protect Trade Secrets
As the previous discussion indicates, MNCs face a high
evidentiary problem in proving breach of trade secrets and, in
addition, could become ensnared in a murky web of risky and
dangerous problems when seeking to enforce rights once the theft of a
trade secret has occurred. Given the risk involved in enforcing a trade
secret after theft has occurred, the prevention of the theft or
disclosure of a trade secret becomes a much more attractive option.
This Part now details how the use of these preventative measures can
avoid the enforcement pitfalls detailed in Part III.C of this Article.
If the employee has signed a confidentiality agreement with an
MNC's Chinese business entity, the MNC may be able to prevent an
existing employee from disclosing trade secrets through injunctive
relief. In a significant development, a Shanghai court recently issued
an injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, Eli Lilly and its China
business entity Lilly (China) Research & Development Co., Ltd.

197.
See 2013 SPC Interpretation, supra note 196, art. 6 (providing that
"[w]here, in the labor contract or confidentiality agreement, the parties agree on noncompetition but fail to agree on the payment of economic indemnity to the employee
after the rescission or termination of the labor contract, if the employee performs the
non-competition obligation and claims a monthly payment of economic indemnity from
the employer as per 30% of the employee's average monthly wage for the 12 months
before the rescission or termination of his or her labor contract, the people's court shall
support such a claim.").
198.
See id. art. 8 ("Where the parties agree on non-competition and economic
indemnity in the labor contract or confidentiality agreement, if the employee requests
the removal of the non-competition clause on the ground of non-payment of economic
indemnity for three months after the rescission or termination of the labor contract for
reasons attributable to the employer, the people's court shall support such a request.").
199. See id. art. 10 ("Where the employer requests the employee's continued
performance of the non-competition obligation as agreed on after the employee pays a
penalty for his or her breach of the non-competition clause to the employer, the people's
court shall support such a request.").
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(hereinafter both "Lilly"). 200 The employee had signed a labor contract
and a confidentiality agreement with the plaintiffs.20 1 The employee
downloaded twenty-one confidential documents from Lilly's computer
server without consent.2 02 Lilly asked the employee to delete the
documents and after the employee refused, Lilly terminated the
employment. 203 Lilly obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting
the employee from disclosing any of the data and requiring the
204
The
employee to post a bond for RMB100,000 as security.
the
100
of
Article
amended
the
2013
under
issued
injunction was
205
an
issue
to
the
court
100
authorizes
Article
Civil Procedure Law.
destroying
from
the
party
prohibiting
order
evidence preservation
evidence and also authorizes the equivalent of a preliminary
injunction.20 6 This case is the only known case in China in which a
court issued a preliminary injunction preventing an ex-employee from
disclosing trade secrets. Lilly was able to obtain this result because it
was able to meet all of the elements in the burden of proof of a
violation of trade secrets case. 207 Lilly had a written confidentiality
agreement, documentary evidence of ownership of a trade secret,
documentary evidence of the defendant's possession of the plaintiffs
trade secret (the downloaded files), and documentary evidence in the
form of computer records that the defendant had obtained the trade
secrets illegally. Although it is possible that Lilly might have been
able to obtain relief without such strong documentary evidence, the
existence of such a documentary record surely facilitated the ability of
Lilly to obtain the first known preliminary injunction preventing
disclosure of a trade secret in China.
Having a strong documentary record will also assist an MNC in
dealing with ex-employees, an even more troublesome problem since
the ex-employee may have been lured to work for a competitor. If the

See Zhan, supra note 7 (reporting that "[t]he first preliminary injunction
200.
issued for a trade secret case in Shanghai is based on the amended Civil Procedure
Law").
201.
See id. ("Lilly and the Employee entered into a labor contract and a
confidential agreement on 3 May 2011.").
202.
See id. ("The Employee ... downloaded confidential documents from the
server of Lilly without the consent of the plaintiffs on 19 January 2013.").
203.
See id. ("Lilly terminated the employment contract with the Employee on
27 January 203 after failure to request the Employee to delete the confidential
documents.").
204.
See id. ("[T]he plaintiffs applied with the court to issue the injunction to
prevent the Employee from copying, disclosing, using or licensing any third party to
use the twenty-one documents which included trade secrets of the plaintiffs, and
provided the security in the amount of RMB100,000 to the court for the application of
the injunction.").
See Civil Procedure Law of the PRC, supra note 114, art. 100.
205.
See id.
206.
See 2007 SPC Interpretation, supra note 90, art. 14 (defining burden of
207.
proof for trade secrets claims); see also supra Part III.C (discussing high evidentiary
burden and traps in the enforcement process).
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MNC has the employee sign a confidentiality agreement and a noncompetition clause, then the MNC and its Chinese FIE should
conduct an exit interview in order to obtain information about the
employee's new place of employment. 208 If the employee is evasive or
otherwise gives the MNC reason to doubt his intentions, the 2013
SPC Interpretation allows the employer to obtain a court order that
enforces the non-competition agreement. 209 If the MNC has reason to
know that a departing employee intends to work for a competitor, the
MNC might wish to engage a private investigation company in order
to discover the identity of the employer, since the employee might not
be forthcoming with this information. 2 10 The MNC must be careful to
draft the non-competition agreement in accordance with the
requirements of the Labor Contract Law, 21 ' and, in particular, the
FIE must pay the monthly compensation as required by lawotherwise the non-competition agreement becomes unenforceable. 2 12
If the MNC has met all of these requirements, the MNC might be
able to obtain a preliminary injunction enjoining the employee from
working for a competitor.
Note carefully that the MNC is not trying to enforce a trade
secret directly when dealing with a former employee who intends to
work for a competitor. The MNC is seeking to enforce the noncompetition agreement. This is a crucial distinction. The
requirements for enforcing such an agreement are (1) a noncompetition agreement that satisfies the permitted scope of such

208.
See Bai & Da, supra note 12, at 366 (describing how exit interviews are a
way of ensuring that employees are not taking any company information to their new
jobs and reminding them that their obligation not disclose trade secrets extends beyond
their employment with the company).
209.
See 2013 SPC Interpretation, supra note 196, art. 10 ("Where the employer
requests the employee's continued performance of the non-competition obligation as
agreed on after the employee pays a penalty for his or her breach of non-competition
clause to the employer, the people's court shall support such a request.").
210.
Private investigation companies are commonly used in China and are
tolerated by PRC enforcement authorities. Private investigation companies are
technically not permitted since they engage in investigatory work that is similar to
police work, but, due to a shortage of resources, PRC authorities tolerate private
investigation companies, which are able to obtain business licenses as media
companies or market research companies. See Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting, supra note
32, at 764 (discussing the Chinese private investigation industry, including its
dramatic growth and ongoing issues).
211.
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Lao Dong He Tong Fa
[Labor Contract Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the
(
Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), arts. 2324 (China) (defining the scope and availability of non-competition agreements).
212.
See id. art. 23 ("[T]he Unit shall pay economic compensation to the laborer
on a monthly basis during the term of non-competition after the termination of the
labor contract."); see also 2013 SPC Interpretation, supra note 196, arts. 6, 10
(mandating compensation for the performance of non-competition agreements by
employees).
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agreements under the Labor Contract Law, 213 (2) a confidentiality
agreement, 214 and (3) payment of compensation for the noncompetition obligation. 215 In enforcing a non-competition agreement,
the plaintiff is not required to prove the existence of a trade secret or
its theft by the employee. Compared with the evidentiary burden for
proving the breach of a trade secret, this evidentiary burden is far
lower and easier to satisfy. Moreover, enforcing a non-competition
agreement does not get the MNC entangled with the PSB or with a
state-owned research institute. If the MNC has planned carefully, the
MNC should have documentary evidence, of the three requirements
set forth above, 2 16 for the enforcement of a non-competition
agreement in its records.

V. CONCLUSION

The law of trade secrets is still evolving in China, but it remains
fragmented and is behind in its development compared to laws
relating to other forms of intellectual property. The primary law
applicable to trade secrets, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, was
enacted over two decades ago, and there is no sign that a unified law
will be enacted in the place of all of the scattered provisions that
currently exist.
A comparison with trademarks illustrates the significantly
higher evidentiary burden that is required for the enforcement of
trade secrets. The plaintiff is required to show documentary evidence
of three elements: (1) the plaintiff owned a trade secret, (2) the
defendant has in its possession identical or substantially similar
information to the plaintiffs trade secret, and (3) the defendant
illegally obtained the trade secret. This type of evidence is often
unavailable or is in the possession of the defendant. The plaintiff is
not aided in overcoming these evidentiary burdens in Chinese courts
by any presumptions or the shifting of the burden of proof.

See Labor Contract Law of the PRC, art. 24 ("The personnel subject to non213.
competition provisions shall be limited to the Unit's senior management, senior
technicians and other personnel who have knowledge of trade secrets of the Unit. The
scope, territory and term of the non-competition provisions shall be agreed upon by the
Unit and the laborer, and such agreement shall not violate laws and regulations.").
See id. art. 17 (providing for confidentiality agreements in employment
214.
contracts).
See id. art. 23 (providing for economic compensation for employees acting in
215.
accordance with non-competition agreements); see also 2013 SPC Interpretation, supra
note 196, arts. 6, 10 (same).
See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Fan Bu Zheng Dang Jing Zheng Fa
216.
9)
[Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC]
(9A
&0RI
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong.,. Sept. 2, 1993,
effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 10 (China); see also supra text accompanying note 86.
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In order to obtain such documentary evidence that is in the
possession of the defendant, the MNC might find it necessary to file a
criminal case with the PSB because the PSB has wide investigatory
powers and can compel the defendant to produce evidence. Such a
mechanism does not exist in civil cases in China because China lacks
a discovery system. The PSB might then engage the services of a
state-owned technology consultancy organization to submit an
expert's report on the existence of the trade secret and its theft. As
many MNCs have discovered, dealing with the PSB and a stateowned research institute could result in an entanglement that could
lead the MNC to make repeated cash payments, acts that could be
illegal under both PRC 217 and U.S. law. 218
To avoid the high evidentiary burdens and the risky
entanglements with PRC authorities, the MNC should invest
significant resources in implementing preventative measures. The
focus of these measures should be in developing a solid documentary
record that would allow the MNC to enforce confidentiality
obligations against existing employees and non-competition
agreements against former employees. The evidentiary burdens
involved with these preventative measures are far lower than those
involved in enforcing trade secrets and do not require the MNC to
become ensnared into dealing with Chinese authorities. As the
discussion in this Article indicates, once the theft of the trade secret
has occurred, the MNC is left with few effective options under the
current legal system.2 19 While China's recent self-proclaimed
emphasis on improving its legal system relating to trade secrets is a
promising development, 220 MNCs would be ill-advised to rely on this
pronouncement as a solution. The flaws with the current system are
too complex and some of the problems (e.g., government corruption)
are too fundamental to admit an easy solution. MNCs should develop
a detailed and sophisticated program of preventative measures and a
detailed documentary record. Documented preventative measures
protecting trade secrets should be a high priority for all MNCs doing
business in China in an age where proprietary know-how, knowledge,
and information are more important than ever in doing business in
the modern global economy.

217.
See supra text accompanying note 144.
218.
See Chow, China Under the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, supra note 145
(recommending compliance with the FCPA to mitigate risks that might await MNCs
doing business in China).
219.
See supra Part III.C.
220.
See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 11 ("China will accelerate its
negotiation on accession to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)
and submit a revised offer in 2014 that is on the whole commensurate with the
coverage of GPA parties.").

